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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS
Bruce J. Winick*
1. PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: A TRANSFORMATION IN THE
JUDICIAL ROLE
In the past dozen or so years, a remarkable transformation has
occurred in the role of the courts.' Courts traditionally have func-
tioned as governmental mechanisms of dispute resolution, resolv-
ing disputes between private parties concerning property,
contracts, and tort damages, or between the government and an
individual concerning allegations of criminal wrongdoing or regula-
tory violations. In these cases, courts typically have functioned as
neutral arbiters, resolving issues of historical facts or supervising
juries engaged in the adjudicatory process.
Recently, a range of new kinds of problems, many of which are
social and psychological in nature, have appeared before the
courts. These cases require the courts to not only resolve disputed
issues of fact, but also to attempt to solve a variety of human
problems that are responsible for bringing the case to court. Tradi-
tional courts limit their attention to the narrow dispute in contro-
versy. These newer courts, however, attempt to understand and
address the underlying problem that is responsible for the immedi-
ate dispute, and to help the individuals before the court to effec-
tively deal with the problem in ways that will prevent recurring
court involvement.
The new courts, increasingly known as problem solving courts,2
are specialized tribunals established to deal with specific problems,
often involving individuals who need social, mental health, or sub-
stance abuse treatment services. These courts also include criminal
cases involving individuals with drug or alcoholism problems,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Comments or ques-
tions for the Author should be addressed to bwinick@aw.miami.edu.
1. Leonore M. J. Simon, Proactive Judges: Solving Problems and Transforming
Communities, in THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS (David Car-
son & Ray Bull eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 4-7, on file with author).
2. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS,
CCJ RESOLUTION 22 & COSCA RESOLUTION 4: IN SUPPORT OF PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS (2000) [hereinafter CCJ RESOLUTION 22 & COSCA RESOLUTION 4], at http:/
/cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Resolutions/resolutionproblemsolvingcts.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2002).
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mental health problems, or problems of family and domestic vio-
lence. The juvenile court is the forerunner of these specialized
courts; it was started in Chicago in 1899 as an attempt to provide a
rehabilitative approach to the problem of juvenile delinquency,
rather than the punitive approach of the adult criminal court. The
modern antecedents of this movement are the drug treatment
courts, founded in Miami in 1989.4
The drug treatment court was a response to the recognition that
processing nonviolent drug possession charges in the criminal
courts and then sentencing the offender to prison did not succeed
in changing the offender's addictive behavior.' Criminal court
dockets had become swollen with these drug cases, and the essen-
tially retributivist intervention of the criminal court and prison
seemed to do little to avoid repetition of the underlying problem.6
The result was a "revolving door effect in which [drug offenders
typically] resumed their drug-abusing behavior after [being] re-
leased from prison."7 Instead of relying on the traditional criminal
justice approach, the drug treatment court emphasized the of-
fender's rehabilitation, and placed the judge as a member of the
3. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967) (recapitulating the development of
the differences between adult and juvenile justice); Janet Gilbert et al., Applying
Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency),
52 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2001) (supplying a brief historical background of the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act of July 1, 1899, which established the first juvenile court);
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (describing the
establishment of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899).
4. John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Court in Miami, in THE
EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 19, 23 (W. Clinton
Terry ed., 1999); Peggy F. Hora, A Dozen Years of Drug Treatment Courts: Uncover-
ing Our Theoretical Foundation and the Construction of a Mainstream Paradigm, 37
SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1469, 1483 (2002); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Drug Treatment Courts: A Symbiotic Relationship, in
PRINCIPLES OF ADDICTION MEDICINE (Allan W. Graham & Terry K. Schultz eds., 3d
ed. forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, 6-7, on file with authors) (discussing the relation-
ship between therapeutic jurisprudence and specialized problem solving courts, such
as drug treatment courts); see Peggy F. Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and The
Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Re-
sponse to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 453-54
(1999) (describing drug treatment courts as "judicially initiated treatment solutions
for a certain class of drug offenders."); Pamela L. Simmons, Solving the Nation's Drug
Problem: Drug Courts Signal a Move Toward Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 GONZ. L.
REV. 237, 258 (1.999/2000) (attributing nationwide success of drug courts to therapeu-
tic jurisprudence).
5. See Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2).
6. See Goldkamp, supra note 4, at 20-24; see also Winick & Wexler, supra note 4
(manuscript at 2) (discussing the ineffectiveness of criminal courts in permanently
changing drug offenders).
7. Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2).
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treatment team.8 Offenders accepting diversion to the drug treat-
ment court, or pleading guilty and agreeing to participate in the
drug treatment court as a condition of probation, agreed to several
conditions; to remain drug-free, "to participate in a prescribed
course of drug treatment, to submit to periodic drug testing in or-
der to monitor their compliance [with the treatment plan], and to
report [periodically] to court for judicial supervision of their
progress."9
These court's success in helping many addicts to end their addic-
tion and to avoid re-involvement with the criminal court led to a
tremendous growth in the number of drug courts nationally and
internationally, with the result that, as of December 2000, there
were 697 such courts in America, and many more in the planning
stage.'0 Indeed, there now are juvenile drug treatment courts,
which specialize in juveniles with drug abuse problems, and depen-
dency drug treatment courts, that deal with families with drug
problems that are charged with child abuse or neglect."
Other specialized treatment courts or problem solving courts, as
they are now known, include domestic violence courts, 12 which at-
tempt to protect the victims of domestic violence, to motivate per-
petrators of domestic violence to attend batterer's intervention
programs, and to monitor compliance with court orders and treat-
8. Id. (manuscript at 3).
9. Id.
10. CAROLINE S. COOPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000 DRUG COURT SURVEY
REPORT: PROGRAM OPERATIONS, SERVICES AND PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVES EXEC-
UTIVE SUMMARY [DRAFT] 3 (2001), available at http://www.american.edu/aca-
demic.depts/spa/justice/publications/execsum.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). As of
November 2001 there were 502 Adult Drug Courts, 191 Juvenile Drug Courts, 37
Family Drug Courts, and 39 Tribal Drug Courts. Id.
11. Barbara A. Babb & Judith D. Moran, Substance Abuse, Families, and Unified
Family Courts: The Creation of a Caring Justice System, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 1, 18 (1999) (describing the creation of the Family Division of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, Maryland); Amy K. Brown, Drug Courts Help Keep Families To-
gether, F.B. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2001, at 1, available at http://www.flabar.org/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
12. See, e.g., Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M. J. Simon, The Development of a
Specialized Domestic Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing Innovative
Judicial Paradigms, 69 UMKC L. REV. 139, 139 (2000); Amy Karan et al., Domestic
Violence Courts: What Are They and How Should We Manage Them?, JuV. & FAM.
CT. J., Spring 1999, at 75, 75-82; Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in
Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 36 (2000) [hereinafter Winick, Do-
mestic Violence].
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ment progress.' 3 More than two hundred domestic violence courts
now exist.' n
Reentry courts are another form of problems solving courts.
These courts were designed to assist offenders that are released
from prison into a form of judicially-supervised parole, to effect a
successful integration into the community. 5 A recently proposed
application of the reentry court model deals with sex offenders and
attempts to manage the risk of their reoffending through close su-
pervision and monitoring through the use of polygraph
examinations. 16
Another example is the dependency court, a branch of family
court that deals with issues of child abuse and neglect. 7 This is a
civil court that adjudicates whether child abuse or neglect has oc-
curred, and when it has, it attempts to provide services designed to
avoid its repetition.'8 When such services appear fruitless, the de-
pendency court works to terminate parental rights and arrange fos-
ter care for the child.' 9
Teen court, sometimes known as youth court, is another problem
solving court." This court deals with cases involving juveniles
charged with minor offenses.2' In addition, it allows other
juveniles who have been through the teen court process, and who
13. Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 36-45.
14. See Karan et al., supra note 12, at 75 (finding that in "a 1998 survey over 200
courts reported having some specialized processing practice for domestic violence
cases."); Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 39.
15. John Q. LaFond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Reentry Courts: A Cost Ef-
fective Proposal for Managing Sex Offender Risk in the Community, in SEXUAL AG-
GRESSION: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT (Robert Prentky et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 26-28, on file with author); Joan Petersilia, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political, Economic, and
Social Consequences, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
Nov. 2000, at 1, 5, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/l84253.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2003); Terry Saunders, Staying Home: Effective Reintegration Strategies
for Parolees, 41 JUDGES' J., Winter 2002, at 34, 35; Jeremy Travis, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, SENTENCING & CORREC-
TIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, May 2000, at 1, 8, available at http://
www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/181413.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
16. LaFond & Winick, supra note 15 (manuscript at 27-28).
17. Brown, supra note 11, at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Butts & Janeen Buck, The Sudden Popularity of Teen
Courts, 41 JUDGES' J., Winter 2002, at 29, 29; Allison R. Shiff & David B. Wexler,
Teen Court.: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 287, 287-98 (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
21. Shiff & Wexler, supra note 20, at 287.
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have received special training, to play the role of prosecutor, de-
fense attorney, or member of the jury.22 This special process pro-
vides the juveniles charged with minor offenses with the ability to
see their behavior from the victims' or society's perspective and to
receive an inoculation of empathy training.23
One of the most recent types of problem solving courts to
emerge is the mental health court,24 started in 1997 in Broward
County, Florida.2 5 The mental health court is a misdemeanor crim-
inal court designed to deal with people arrested for minor offenses
whose major problem is mental illness rather than criminality.2 6
This is a revolving door category of patients who are periodically
committed to mental hospitals where they are treated with psycho-
tropic medication. 7 Due to the use of medication, they experience
sufficient improvement, which allows hospitals to discharge them,
but, when they are back in the community, they fail to take their
medication.28 As a result, they frequently decompensate, some-
times committing minor offenses that result in their arrest.29
Mental health courts seek to divert them from the criminal justice
system and to persuade them to voluntarily accept treatment while
in the community.30 In addition, they link them with treatment re-
22. Id. at 289-95.
23. Id. at 288.
24. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & CHERYL IRONS-GUYNN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILl IN THE CRIMINAL
CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FT. LAUDERDALE, SEAITILE, SAN BERNAR-
DINO, AND ANCHORAGE 9 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/bja/
182504.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); Randal B. Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor
Mental Health Court Incorporates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Re-
storative Justice, in MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATION 14-1 to 14-22 (Jacqueline
Moore ed., 2003); Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Action: Spe-
cialized Courts for the Mentally Ill, 84 JUDICATURE 184, 184 (2000); Bruce J. Winick,
Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 39, on file with author) [hereinafter
Winick, Outpatient Commitment].
25. John Petrila et al., Preliminary Observations from an Evaluation of the Brow-
ard County Mental Health Court, 37 CT. REV. 14, 15-16 (2001).
26. Id. at 16.
27. Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4, 14); see
GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 24, at vii (discussing jail overcrowding and
the increased number of persons with mental illness and with co-occurring mental
illness and substance abuse in the criminal justice system); Petrila et al., supra note
25, at25 (discussing how mentally ill patients are frequently being arrested).
28. Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4, 14).
29. Id. (manuscript at 14).
30. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 24, at 31, 89; Petrila et al., supra note
25, at 14-15.
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sources, and provide social service support and judicial monitoring
to ensure treatment compliance."
All of these courts grew out of the recognition that traditional
judicial approaches have failed, at least in the areas of substance
abuse, domestic violence, certain kinds of criminality, child abuse
and neglect, and mental illness. These are all recycling problems,
the reoccurrence of which traditional interventions did not succeed
in bringing to a halt. The traditional judicial model addressed the
symptoms, but not the underlying problem. The result was that the
problem reemerged, constantly necessitating repeated judicial in-
tervention. All these areas involved specialized problems that
judges of courts of general jurisdiction lacked expertise in. Moreo-
ver, they involved treatment or social service needs that traditional
courts lacked the tools to deal with.
In response to these failures, courts decided that they needed
new judicial approaches. These new approaches involve a collabo-
rative, interdisciplinary approach to problem solving where the
judge plays a leading role. Not only is the judge a leading actor in
the therapeutic drama, but also the courtroom itself becomes a
stage for the acting out of many crucial scenes. On this stage, the
judge also assumes the role of director, coordinating the roles of
many of the actors, providing a needed motivation for how they
will play their parts, and inspiring them to play them well.
The new problem solving courts are all characterized by active
judicial involvement, and the explicit use of judicial authority to
motivate individuals to accept needed services and to monitor their
compliance and progress. They are concerned not merely with
processing and resolving the court case, but in achieving a variety
of tangible outcomes associated with avoiding reoccurrence of the
problem. Problem solving courts generate the need for new kinds
of information not typically collected by courts, and, in the process,
have significantly improved the quality and quantity of information
needed to understand the problem and deal more effectively with
it.32 They play an educative role in raising community conscious-
31. GOLDKAMP & IRONS-GUYNN, supra note 24, at 10, 31.
32. See, e.g., LaFond & Winick, supra note 15 (manuscript at 8-9) (discussing the
use of risk assessment instruments and polygraph examinations to gather information
about released sex offenders in order to increase the effectiveness of court supervi-
sion and monitoring); Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 55 (discussing the
use of risk assessment instruments by domestic violence courts to gather information
concerning a batterer's risk of re-offending); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manu-
script at 2-5) (noting drug treatment court's ongoing and constant intervention into
defendant's rehabilitation).
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ness about the problem in question, its causes, and the resources
that courts need to resolve it.33 In addition, they become advocates
for the populations they deal with and for the increased allocation
of community resources needed to resolve their problems.34 Fi-
nally, they work closely with community agencies and treatment
providers, and, in the process, monitor and improve their
effectiveness. 35
Problem solving courts represent a significant new direction for
the judiciary. These judges seek to actively and holistically resolve
both the judicial case and the problem that produced it.36 They
extend help to people in need by connecting them to community
resources, motivating them through creative uses of the court's au-
thority to accept needed services and treatment, and monitoring
their progress in ways that help to ensure their success.37  By
targeting recurring problems that seem to be the product of behav-
ioral, psychological, or psychiatric difficulties or disorders, and in-
tervening to prevent their reoccurrence, these courts can be seen as
applying a public health approach to social and behavioral
problems that cause serious individual suffering and deterioration
in the quality of community life. Not only have these techniques
emerged in the specialized problem solving courts described above,
but also judges in general courts have begun to apply the problem
solving approaches derived from these courts.38
33. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 4, at 462-68; Karan et al., supra note 12, at 75;
Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 37; Winick, Outpatient Commitment,
supra note 24 (manuscript at 12-13).
34. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 4, at 453; Winick, Domestic Violence, supra
note 12, at 39-40; Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 12).
35. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 833-34 (2000).
36. See id. at 832 (discussing how drug treatment courts were created in response
to the excessive amount of cocaine and crack offenses, and how their intentions are to
rehabilitate these offenders instead of sending them to jail).
37. Id. at 843-50.
38. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for
Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 469, 522-23 (1998); Brown, supra note 11, at 1; Pamela Casey & David
B. Rottman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Courts, 18 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 445, 454-55
(2000); Gilbert et al., supra note 3, at 1175-77; William Schma, Judging for the New
Millennium, 37 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2000); David B. Wexler, Robes and Rehabilitation: How
Judges Can Help Offenders Make Good, 38 CT. REV. 18, 18-19 (2001).
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II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AS A THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION FOR PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS
The problem solving courts' revolution has been largely athe-
oretical. It grew out of experimental approaches used in drug
treatment courts to facilitate the substance abuse treatment pro-
cess, which, because of their success, were transplanted into other
judicial arenas.39 These programs appear to be successful, although
the empirical research on their efficacy remains preliminary and
often methodologically flawed.4" Why these programs seem to
work, however, has remained largely unexamined.
Therapeutic jurisprudence can be seen as a theoretical grounding
for this developing judicial movement. We can understand the
problem solving courts' revolution by situating it within the schol-
arly and law reform approach known as therapeutic jurispru-
dence.4' Therapeutic jurisprudence began in the late 1980s as an
interdisciplinary scholarly approach in the area of mental health
law.42 It criticized various aspects of mental health law for produc-
ing antitherapeutic consequences for the people that the law was
designed to help.43
Legal rules and the way they are applied are social forces that
produce inevitable, and sometimes negative, consequences for the
39. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
40. See STEVEN BELENKO, THE NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AT COLUMBIA UNIV., RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2001 Up-
DATE 26-33 (2001), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/usr-doc/researchon-
drug.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). Compare Hora et al., supra note 4, at 449-50,
with Morris Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437,1489-90 (2000).
41. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEU-
TIC JURISI'RUDENCE 17-18 (1991); BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
APPLIEI: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTII LAW 3-8 (1997); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship [hereinafter Wexler,
Changing Conceptions[, in LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 20, at 597, 597-610; Bruce J. Winick, The Juris-
prudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 184 (1997)
[hereinafter Winick, The Jurisprudence].
42. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERA-
PEUTIC AGENI 3-4 (1990); WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 41, at 6.
43. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization:
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIA-
TRY 169, 172 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent] (criticizing the
United States Supreme Court's broad dicta in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990), that voluntary admission to a mental hospital should always be preceded by an
inquiry into the individual's competence to consent to voluntary hospitalization);
Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated
Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571,
582-85 (1995) [hereinafter Winick, Reforming Incompetencyl (criticizing incompe-
tency to stand trial doctrine and practice).
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psychological well-being of those affected. Therapeutic jurispru-
dence's basic insight was that scholars should study those conse-
quences and reshape and redesign law in order to accomplish two
goals 4 4-too minimize antitherapeutic effects, and when it is con-
sistent with other legal goals, to increase law's therapeutic poten-
tial.45 Thus, therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary
approach to legal scholarship that has a law reform agenda. Al-
though it started in the area of mental health law, therapeutic juris-
prudence soon spread to other areas of legal analysis, and has
emerged as a mental health approach to law generally."6
Therapeutic jurisprudence is not only concerned with measuring
the therapeutic impact of legal rules and procedures, but also of
the way they are applied by various legal actors-judges, lawyers,
police officers, and expert witnesses testifying in court, among
others.41 Whether they know it or not, these legal actors are thera-
peutic agents, affecting the mental health and psychological well-
being of the people they encounter in the legal setting. For exam-
ple, how lawyers deal with their clients in the law office and the
courtroom can have a significant impact on a client's emotional
well-being, and therapeutic jurisprudence has spawned a growing
literature concerning how attorneys should act in this regard.48
44. See Bruce Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN
A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
20, at 645, 647-52.
45. Id.
46. See David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 20, at 713, 713-21; Winick, The Jurisprudence, supra note 41, at 184. For an
up-to-date bibliography of therapeutic jurisprudence work, see the Therapeutic Juris-
prudence website, at http://www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org (last visited Mar. 15,
2003).
47. See Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 91 (proposing a more thera-
peutic application of the law in domestic violence cases); Winick, Outpatient Commit-
ment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 31-48) (discussing how judges and lawyers can play
their role more therapeutically in conducting civil commitment hearings, conditional
release hearings, and in mental health court); Winick, The Jurisprudence, supra note
41, at 201 (describing the increasing body of therapeutic jurisprudence work ranging
across a large spectrum of legal issues); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 52-60 (1999)
[hereinafter Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing] (proposing how judges, lawyers, and
expert witnesses can apply the law more therapeutically in civil commitment cases).
48. See, e.g., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000) (anthology of essays applying thera-
peutic jurisprudence approach to lawyering); Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Preventive Law: Transforming Legal Practice and Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 793, 793-1210 (Bruce J. Winick et al. eds., 1999) (containing a symposium
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In a similar way, therapeutic jurisprudence has much to offer
judges concerning how they treat the people appearing before
them and courts concerning how they should be structured and ad-
ministered to maximize their therapeutic potential. Therapeutic ju-
risprudence uses insights from psychology and the behavioral
sciences to critique legal and judicial practices, and to suggest how
they can be reshaped to increase their therapeutic potential and
avoid the risk of psychological harm.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is one of the major "vectors" of a
growing movement in the law towards a common goal of a more
comprehensive, humane, and psychologically optimal way of han-
dling legal matters.4 9 Problem solving courts are also one of these
"vectors," and thus, share many common aims with therapeutic ju-
risprudence." Thus, one may see problem solving courts as related
to therapeutic jurisprudence, but they are not identical with the
concept. Problem solving courts often use principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence to enhance their functioning. Indeed, the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Adminis-
trators, following a joint task force analysis, recently adopted a
resolution approving the growing movement in the direction of
problem solving courts, and their use of principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence in performing their functions.5 These principles in-
clude "integration of treatment services with judicial case process-
ing, ongoing judicial intervention, close monitoring of and
immediate response to behavior, multidisciplinary involvement,
and collaboration with community-based and governmental
organizations. "52
Although problem solving courts developed separately from
therapeutic jurisprudence, their development occurred at the same
time, and they share similar aims. Drug treatment courts, domestic
violence courts, and mental health courts, for example, can be seen
as taking a therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the processing of
of articles applying the therapeutic jurisprudence/preventive law model to lawyering
in various contexts).
49. See Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Compre-
hensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
HELPING PROFESSION, supra note 48, at 465.
50. See Casey & Rottman, supra note 38, at 454 (stating that "therapeutic jurispru-
dence principles are consistent with court performance goals."); David B. Rottman &
Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence of Problem Solving
Courts, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Summer 1999, at 12-19; Simon, supra note 1 (manuscript
at 2-7); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 1).
51. CCJ RESOLUTION 22 & COSCA RESOLUTION 4, supra note 2.
52. Id.
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cases, inasmuch as their goal is the rehabilitation of the offender
and their use of the legal process, in particular, the role of the
judge, to accomplish this goal. 3 All of these courts seek to deal
with the offender's underlying problem, and emphasize its resolu-
tion through the provision of treatment and rehabilitative services
where the judge is an important member of the treatment team.54
Judges in these specialized courts receive special training in the na-
ture and treatment of drug addiction,55 domestic violence,56 and
mental illness, 57 and themselves function as therapeutic agents
through their supervision and monitoring of the offender's treat-
ment progress. Unlike traditional judges functioning in traditional
courts, judges in problem solving courts consciously view them-
selves as therapeutic agents, and, therefore, one can see them as
playing a therapeutic jurisprudence function in their dealings with
the individuals who appear before them.
Moreover, principles of therapeutic jurisprudence can help prob-
lem solving court judges play this function well. Therapeutic juris-
prudence has already produced a large body of interdisciplinary
scholarship analyzing principles of psychology and the behavioral
sciences, and probing the ways in which they can be used in legal
contexts to improve mental health and emotional well-being.5 A
growing body of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship has also ad-
dressed how judges in specialized problem solving courts can apply
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence in their work.5 9 For in-
stance, a recent symposium issue of Court Review, the official pub-
lication of the American Judges Association, was devoted entirely
53. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 35, at 841-44, 852; Winick, Domestic Violence,
supra note 12, at 39-45; Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at
31-39).
54. See supra notes 7-31 and accompanying text.
55. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 476-77.
56. Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 44.
57. Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 38).
58. See, e.g., LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JU-
RISPRUDENCE, supra note 20 (anthology of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship
ranging across the legal spectrum).
59. See, e.g., Casey & Rottman, supra note 38, at 451-52, 455-56; Fritzler, supra
note 24, at 14-1 to 14-22; Fritzler & Simon, supra note 12, at 59-62; Hora, supra note 4,
at 1472-73, 1477, 1481-84; Hora et al., supra note 4, at 476-77; see also Carrie J. Pe-
trucci, Respect as a Component in the Judge-Defendant Interaction in a Specialized
Domestic Violence Court that Utilizes Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL.
263, 266-67, 288-94 (2002); Shiff & Wexler, supra note 20, at 291-95 (discussing the
therapeutic jurisprudence of teen courts); Simon, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6);
Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36); Winick & Wexler,
supra note 4 (manuscript at 1-7).
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to therapeutic jurisprudence and its application to judging.6° An
understanding of therapeutic jurisprudence's approach and of the
psychological and social work principles it uses can thus provide
considerable help in the structuring of problem solving courts and
in defining the role played by judges functioning within them.
Both therapeutic jurisprudence and problem solving courts see
the law as an instrument for helping people, particularly those with
a variety of psychological and emotional problems. Our society
has not done a particularly good job of dealing with many social
problems, with the result that society often dumps them at the
doorstep of the courthouse. When courts deal with such vexing
problems as drug addiction, alcoholism, domestic violence, mental
illness, child abuse and neglect, and juvenile delinquency, they can
be seen to function as psychosocial agencies. In order for problem
solving courts to succeed and function well, however, they need to
be aware of some basic principles of psychology and social work.
Thus, therapeutic jurisprudence can be understood as providing a
theoretical foundation for much of the problem solving court
movement, and a variety of principles that can help judges play this
new and exciting role.
I11. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
PROBLEM SOLVING COURT JUDGES
Problem solving courts are less involved with the adjudication of
historic issues of fact than with functioning as psychosocial agen-
cies that attempt to rehabilitate an offender or provide access to
services designed to address the underlying problem that has
brought the individual to court and monitor and supervise the
treatment process. Therapeutic jurisprudence can provide instru-
mental prescriptions for how judges in problem solving courts can
perform these new tasks.6' Just as judges dealing with antitrust
cases need to understand basic principles of economics and judges
dealing with patent cases need to understand basic principles of
engineering, judges in problem solving courts, dealing as they do
with human problems, need to understand some principles of psy-
chology, the science of human behavior. They must be aware that
they are functioning as therapeutic agents, and that how they inter-
act with the individuals appearing before them will have inevitable
60. Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 37 CT. REv. 1, 1-68 (2000).
61. See Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Integrated Inquiry and In-
strumental Prescriptions, 17 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 589, 592-604 (1999) (describing thera-
peutic jurisprudence as providing "instrumental prescriptions" for law reform).
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consequences for their ability to be rehabilitated or otherwise deal
with their underlying problems.
Individuals usually appear before problem solving courts be-
cause of social or psychological problems they have not recognized,
or because of their inability to deal with these problems effectively.
They may have alcoholism or substance abuse problems, which
may contribute to repetitive criminality, domestic violence, or child
abuse and neglect.62 They may be repetitive perpetrators of do-
mestic violence or child abuse because of cognitive distortions con-
cerning their relationships with their spouses or children, or
because they lack the social skills necessary to manage their anger
or resolve problems through means other than violence. 63 They
may suffer from mental illness that impairs their judgment about
the desirability of their continuing to take needed medication.64
They may be in denial about the existence of these problems, refus-
ing to take responsibility for their wrongdoing, rationalizing their
conduct, or minimizing its negative impact on themselves and
others. Many of these are problems that will respond effectively to
available treatment, but only if the individual perceives that she
has a problem and is motivated to deal with it.65
In these situations, the problem solving court judge cannot sim-
ply order the individual to recognize the existence of the problem
and to obtain treatment. People must come to these realizations
for themselves. Therefore, problem solving court judges must un-
derstand that although they can assist people to solve their
problems, they cannot solve them. The individual must confront
and solve her own problem and assume the primary responsibility
for doing so. The judge can help the individual realize this, and,
together with treatment staff, can help the individual to identify
and build upon her own strengths and use them effectively in the
62. See Babb & Moran, supra note 11, at 8-9; Brown, supra note 11, at 1.
63. See Brown, supra note 11, at 1; Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at
77.
64. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 4, 14) (dis-
cussing the conditions and consequences that mentally ill individuals undergo when
they fail to take their medication).
65. See Michael D. Clark, Change-Focused Drug Courts: Examining the Critical
Ingredients of Positive Behavior Change, NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV., Winter 2001, at
35, 44-46, 48-56 (suggesting that treatment programs in general are effective, but that
factors related to the individual's own strengths are more important in treatment effi-
cacy than the particular form of treatment used, and that court and program staff
must build trust and find effective methods to encourage the individual to participate
in treatment, affording increased choice and autonomy).
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collaborative effort of solving the problem.66 How can the judge
facilitate this process?
A. Improving Interpersonal Skills
At the outset, the judge should always treat the individual with
dignity and respect.67 Treatment is a collaborative process between
the individual and the treatment team, including the judge, and the
conditions necessary to forge a genuine treatment alliance include
reciprocal understanding, mutual affirmation, emotional attach-
ment, and respect.68 Therefore, the judge and treatment personnel
must act so as to give the individual the perception that they are
empathic, accepting, warm, and willing to permit self-expression. 69
Judges performing these functions need to improve their inter-
viewing, counseling, and interpersonal skills. Even though they
have engaged in wrongdoing, a special sensitivity to the individ-
ual's pain, shame, sadness, and anxiety in coming to terms with the
existence of psychological or behavioral problems that have pro-
duced criminality and the victimization of others is called for in the
judge-offender interaction.70 Even though judges may strongly dis-
approve of the individual's conduct, they must strive in the judge-
offender dialogue to be supportive, empathetic, warm, and good
listeners.7' These are highly sensitive conversations and offenders
will be less likely to recognize their problems and resolve to deal
with them effectively if they perceive the judge to be cold, insensi-
tive, or judgmental. This is not to say that the judge should excuse
or justify the individual's inappropriate behavior, but the judge
should direct her disapproval at the individual's antisocial conduct,
and not at the individual herself.72 Once the individual has come
to the recognition that her prior behavior has been inappropriate,
the judge and treatment staff should shift to a future-focused orien-
tation that concentrates on the steps needed to solve the prob-
66. See id. at 57-58 (discussing strength based approaches and their importance in
the drug treatment court treatment process).
67. Petrucci, supra note 59, at 285-86.
68. See Clark, supra note 65, at 44-46.
69. See id.
70. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 85 (1989);
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L.
BULL. 244, 257-61 (2002) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Restorative Justice].
71. See Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 70, at 257-61.
72. Id. The literature on restorative justice criticizes the shaming of the individual,
recommending instead "reintegrative shaming," a condemnation of the act and not
the person. Id.
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lem.73 Focusing upon past failures, by contrast, can result in
demoralization and resignation."4 To be an effective agent of
change, the judge should convey empathy to the individual, even if
not to her act.
Empathy involves the ability to experience another person's
feelings and to see the world through that person's eyes.7 5 Empa-
thy has both cognitive and affective components.7 6 The judge
should convey both an intellectual response to the individual, com-
municating that she understands the individual's predicament, and
an emotional response, communicating that she shares the individ-
ual's feelings. The individual, after all, is a fellow human being
with a human problem that the judge is attempting to help her deal
with. Therefore, in discussing the individual's problem with her,
and the need for rehabilitation or treatment, the judge should com-
municate a sense of caring, sympathy, genuineness, and under-
standing.77  Just as physicians need to develop their "bed-side
manner," judges need to develop what can be termed their "bench-
side manner."7 8 This can help create a comfortable space in which
offenders can feel free to express their emotions about their
problems and deal effectively with them.
Judges playing this role need to be sensitive to the psychological
mechanisms of transference and counter-transference, and how
they can affect communication in the judge-offender interaction.
Transference is an individual's tendency to project onto a current
relationship, feelings that originated in prior relationships with
others, frequently parents and siblings.7 9 Counter-transference oc-
73. See Michael D. Clark, Change-Focused Youth Work: The Critical Ingredients of
Positive Behavior Change, 3 J. CENTER FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 59, 63-64 (2001) [herein-
after Clark, Change-Focused Youth]; Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65, at 53-55.
74. See Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65, at 53-54.
75. Bruce J. Winick, Legal Counseling About Advance Directive Instruments: Cli-
ent Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context: Reflections on How Attor-
neys Can Identify and Deal With a Psycholegal Soft Spot, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
901, 909 (1998) [hereinafter Winick, Legal Counseling].
76. Gerald A. Gladstein, Understanding Empathy: Integrating Counseling, Devel-
opmental, and Social Psychology Perspectives, 30 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 467, 468
(1983); Daniel W. Shuman, The Use of Empathy in Forensic Examinations, 3 ETHICS
& BEHAV. 289, 296 (1993).
77. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 145-46 (1995); DANIEL
GOLEMAN, WORKING WITH EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 137-46 (1998); Marjorie A.
Silver, Therapeutic Jurisprudence/ Preventive Law and Law Teaching: Emotional Intel-
ligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1173, 1196-1203 (1999).
78. Cf Francis Peabody, The Care of the Patient, 88 JAMA 877, 877-82 (1927)
(discussing the importance of physician's bedside manner).
79. Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 263-65 (1999) [hereinafter Silver,
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curs when the judge transfers feelings onto the individual that stem
from the judge's own prior relationships. 0 The judge should be
sensitive to the possibility of transference on the part of the indi-
vidual, and should seek to induce positive transference and avoid
negative transference when possible. For example, individuals who
have experienced repeated exposures to the criminal justice system
because of their repetitive wrongdoing are likely to have had par-
ents, family members, teachers, friends, and others unsuccessfully
lecture them about their need to shape up and achieve rehabilita-
tion. To the extent that these individuals infected the lectures with
a paternalistic tone, they might have stimulated feelings of resent-
ment and humiliation or produced a degree of resistance or psy-
chological reactance.8 Hence, problem solving court judges
should seek to avoid tainting their interactions with offenders with
these prior negative feelings and relational images that these for-
mer unsuccessful lectures might have produced.
Similarly, problem solving court judges should be sensitive to the
possibility of counter-transference on their own part, which can in-
terfere with their ability to develop rapport with the individual.
Judges will inevitably have had prior experiences with criminal of-
fenders that have produced anger and other negative reactions di-
rected at such offenders. The reemergence of these negative
feelings engendered in prior relationships with offenders may pro-
duce a negative counter-transference toward the individual appear-
ing in the problem solving court that might compromise the
problem solving court judge's ability to play the therapeutic role
contemplated. Judges, therefore, must be on their guard to avoid
such counter-transference, in other words, to avoid associating the
individual appearing before them in the problem solving court with
prior offenders who may have invoked strong negative emotional
reactions.
In helping offenders come to grips with their criminality and un-
derlying psychological and behavioral problems, problem solving
court judges need to be good listeners.8 2 Rather than giving the
Love & Hate]; Stephanie Stier, Essay Review, Refraining Legal Skills: Relational
Lawyering, 42 J. LE GAL EDUC. 303, 310-12 (1992); Winick, Legal Counseling, supra
note 75, at 911.
80. Silver, Love & Hate, supra note 79, at 262-65; Stier, supra note 79, at 312;
Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 911-1.9.
81. See Sharon S. Brehm & Jack W. Brehm, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A
TiiiEoRY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 13 (1981).
82. See Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65, at 50-51 (discussing the need for im-
proved communication skills in drug treatment court contexts, including the use of
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offender a speech, the judge should seek to promote dialogue. At
appropriate intervals, the offender should be encouraged to speak,
since this will require the judge to stop speaking, signaling to the
individual that what she has to say is important. Problem solving
court judges need to convey to individuals appearing before them
that they genuinely wish to hear them, are interested in their
problems, and are interested in attempting to help them find a so-
lution. They need to listen to the individual in ways that are atten-
tive, non-judgmental, and sympathetic. Finally, active listening and
passive listening techniques may be helpful in this connection.8 3
Problem solving court judges also need to learn to read the indi-
vidual's non-verbal forms of communication and to interpret her
underlying feelings.84 Non-verbal forms of communication, such as
facial expression, body language, and tone of voice, can be impor-
tant clues for understanding both the individual's emotions in the
context of the sensitive judge-offender conversation, and how
judges should respond to them.8 5 Attempting to facilitate the indi-
vidual's acceptance of responsibility for her wrongdoing, and to
motivate the individual to accept help for an underlying problem
that may contribute to it, requires a high degree of psychological
sensitivity on the part of the problem solving court judge.
B. Avoiding Paternalism and Respecting Autonomy
It is important for problem solving court judges to avoid pater-
nalism in these judge-offender interactions. The judge may be fully
aware that the individual suffers from an emotional or psychologi-
cal problem that produces repetitive criminality and that she could
respond effectively to available rehabilitative programs. A pater-
nalistic attitude, however, is not likely to help in facilitating the
individual's recognition of these realities.
Its recipients often experience paternalism as offensive. Pater-
nalism may create resentment and possibly backfire by producing a
reflective listening, in which the judge or treatment staff member frequently checks
the accuracy of what she believes the individual has said); see also Steven Keeva,
Beyond the Words: Understanding What Your Client Is Really Saying Makes for Suc-
cessfid Lawyering, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 60 (providing pointers on good listening
techniques for attorneys to use in lawyer-client conversations); Silver, supra note 77,
at 1174 (discussing listening skills on the part of lawyers).
83. See David A. Binder et al., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 16-24 (1991); see also Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 912.
84. See Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 912 (extolling the virtues of
"nonverbal responses that express interest, caring, warmth, and sympathy"); see also
Stier, supra note 79, at 309.
85. See Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 910-11.
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psychological reactance to the advice offered that might be
counter-productive.86 Many offenders will be in denial about their
underlying problems, and paternalism is unlikely to succeed in al-
lowing them to deal with such denial.87 Instead, it may produce
anxiety and other psychological distress that will make it harder for
them to do so.
Accordingly, problem solving court judges should respect the au-
tonomy of the individuals they are seeking to help, thus, allowing
them to make decisions for themselves about whether to accept
treatment, rather than mandating treatment participation. For ex-
ample, a problem solving court judge should remind an individual
charged with a drug offense that she is free to deal with the charges
in criminal court and accept a sentence to prison if found guilty.
Drug treatment court is not required, but is only an alternative op-
tion. Hence, the judge should remind the offender that the choice
is hers, and that she should not elect the drug treatment court un-
less she is prepared to admit the existence of a problem and ex-
press a willingness to deal with it. This is important because the
approach can be empowering to such individuals who often feel
powerless and helpless.
Individuals should see the role of the problem solving court
judge in discussing rehabilitation with the offender as one of per-
suasion rather than of coercion. Judges should be aware of the psy-
chological value of choice. 88 Self-determination is an essential
aspect of psychological health. Moreover, if individuals who make
their own choices perceive them as non-coerced, they will function
more effectively and with greater satisfaction. People who feel co-
erced, by contrast, may respond with a negative psychological reac-
tion,89  and may experience various other psychological
86. See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 81, at 13; Winick, Legal Counseling, supra
note 75, at 913 (suggesting that if attorneys are not "attentive, nonjudgmental and
sympathetic," clients may respond negatively).
87. See Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 903 (warning that lawyers
should expect that clients may frequently be in denial); see also Bruce J. Winick,
Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentenc-
ing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L.
1034, 1064 (1999) [hereinafter Winick, Redefining].
88. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
334 (1997) [hereinafter WINICK, RIGHT TO REFUSE]; Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and
Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENY. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1997) [hereinafter Winick,
Mental Health]; Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1992) [hereinafter Winick, Autonomy].
89. See BREHM & BREHM, supra note 81, at 49-51 (explaining the results of a test
showing that a removal of "freedom" in choice of essay topic caused a significantly
higher reactance arousal).
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difficulties. 90 In appropriate circumstances, the judge should com-
municate to the individual her own views concerning the individ-
ual's best interests, but should ultimately cede the choice to the
individual. To succeed, treatment or rehabilitation will require a
degree of intrinsic motivation on the part of the individual.91 If she
participates in the program only because of extrinsic motivation,
then it will be less likely that she will internalize the program goals
and genuinely change her attitude and behavior.
The individual should be afforded a choice not only in deciding
whether to elect to participate in a problem solving court, but also
in the design of the rehabilitative plan, when feasible. Typically,
there may be many options available in fashioning such a plan, in-
cluding variations in rehabilitative techniques and service provid-
ers.92 The problem solving court judge can lay the options out for
the individual, who can then exercise choice. The individual's
choice concerning the various issues that arise in the design of the
treatment plan can be empowering, and can influence the likeli-
hood of success.
Some problem solving court judges describe what they do as
"benevolent coercion," and extol the virtues of judicial coercion as
an essential ingredient in the rehabilitative enterprise.93 While
many of the individuals in drug treatment or other problem solving
courts who agree to participate in a course of treatment or rehabili-
tation will benefit from the structure, supervision, and compliance
monitoring that they provide, it is neither appropriate nor desire-
able to regard this as coercion. 94 An individual who decides to ac-
cept diversion to a drug treatment or other problem solving court,
or to plead guilty and accept treatment in a problem solving court
program as a condition of probation, is making a legally voluntary
90. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Impli-
cations for Mental Health Law, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6, 13-22 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Winick, Side Effects].
91. See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 471-72, 477-78 (1986); Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the
Power of the Bet: Wagering With the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Indi-
vidual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 762-63 (1991) [hereinafter Winick, Harnes-
sing]; see also EDWARD DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 53 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1975).
92. See Babb & Moran, supra note 11, at 25-34 (detailing the various options avail-
able to families who are affected by subtance abuse).
93. See, e.g., Jeffrey Tauber, Address at the Eleventh Annual Symposium on Con-
temporary Urban Challenges at the Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 28,
2002), in Problem Solving Courts: Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1755, 1901-05 (2002) ("We have an opportunity through prob-
lem-solving courts to use coercion, but to do it in a benevolent way.").
94. See Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 768-72.
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choice as long as she is not subjected to duress, force, fraud, or a
form of improper inducement.95 Individuals making such choices
may be functioning within a coercive context. Although they may
face hard choices, none of which may be agreeable, they are in
these difficult situations because of their own actions. For exam-
ple, they were not arrested as a vehicle for forcing them into treat-
ment, but because they possessed drugs or committed some other
crime. Moreover, they are free to either plead not guilty and face
trial, or plead guilty and receive an appropriate sentence. There-
fore, extending to them the additional option of accepting a reha-
bilitative alternative does not make the choice they will then face a
coercive one.
An analogy to plea-bargaining is appropriate. Although offend-
ers who have been offered plea deals may feel that the choice they
are required to make is coercive, as long as the prosecutor's offer
was not illegal, unauthorized, unethical, or otherwise inappropri-
ate, the courts have held that it does not constitute legal coercion.96
Accordingly, if an individual's decision about whether to accept a
guilty plea is not coerced, then her decision as to whether to accept
diversion to a problem solving court, or to plead guilty and accept
treatment through the auspices of such a court as a condition for
probation also would not constitute coercion in a legal sense. Plea-
bargaining is an example in which individuals face hard choices,
but where, absent an offer that is improper, illegal, or unethical,
the courts will not consider the choice to be coercive.
Parole from prison presents another example. The criminal jus-
tice system may release an individual on parole before the expira-
tion of her prison term, if she accepts certain conditions of parole.9 7
These conditions may include, for example, an undertaking that the
individual not use alcoholic beverages or associate with other indi-
viduals who have a criminal record.98 Unless the conditions of pa-
role are improper or illegal, we would consider the individual's
choice to accept these conditions as voluntary, rather than co-
95. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308 (1987).
96. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 755, 758 (1970); WERTHEIMER, supra note 95, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301,
308; Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 771 n.107; Winick, Mental Health, supra
note 88, at 1153-55.
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-3566 (2000).
98. Id. § 3563(a)(5), (b)(6).
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erced.99 Even though the individual's desire to be released from
prison might be so powerful that she may feel that she has no real
choice other than to accept the conditions of parole, it would be
absurd for the law to invalidate her choice on grounds of coercion.
As long as the conditions of parole are not unlawful, improper, or
unreasonable, parole accords the individual an opportunity that
she may find more desirable than serving the remainder of her sen-
tence in prison.
Opportunities for diversion from the criminal process are essen-
tially similar. An individual charged with a crime that must decide
between facing her charges or accepting diversion into a rehabilita-
tive program may be facing a hard choice. It is a fair and reasona-
ble choice, however, and is not one that the law will invalidate on
grounds of coercion.100
99. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 95, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308 (discussing how
choices given to defendants are not considered coercive unless illegally imposed upon
them).
100. See McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2042-43 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(distinguishing pressure from compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes, and noting
that compulsion is limited to choices involving grave consequences). At least this is
true where diversion is reasonably related to the offense charged, and does not im-
pose conditions that would themselves be unconstitutional. Requiring mental health
treatment as part of a diversion program for an individual whose offense does not
involve mental illness, for example, would seem to be an arbitrary governmental im-
position, arguably offending due process. Moreover, although an individual may have
the constitutional right to refuse such treatment, such a right may generally be
waived, as long as the waiver is competent, voluntary, and knowing. WINICK, RIGHT
TO REFUSE, supra note 88, at 303, 345-70. While some constitutional rights may be
unwaivable, for example the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, most
will be subject to waiver, at least where the right in question is reasonably related to
the governmental purpose sought to be served. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 317-18 (1971) (requiring waiver of Fourth Amendment right to be free of war-
rantless searches as condition for receipt of certain welfare benefits when such search
was related to assessing continued eligibility for benefits).
It is important that an offender understand the risks of entering into a problem
solving court treatment program as part of diversion from the criminal court or as a
condition of probation, and it is an important role of defense counsel to ensure that
the client possesses this understanding. See Martin Reisig, The Difficult Role of the
Defense Lawyer in a Post-Adjudication Drug Treatment Court. Accommodating Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence and Due Process, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 216, 218-19, 221-23 (2002)
(discussing the relationship between a defense lawyer and a defendant and the role
the defense lawyer should play). Defense counsel who fail to fully advise their clients
in this regard may be depriving them of the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment, particularly since those offenders who repeatedly fail to
comply with program requirements may, as a consequence, be re-diverted back to
criminal court for a revocation of probation or a criminal sentence. See Mae C.
Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37, 54-56 (2000-2001).
Moreover, failing to fully advise the client concerning the potential consequences of
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
The line between coercion and choice can be a narrow one.
Moreover, the concept of legal coercion does not necessarily coin-
cide with the psychological perception of coercion. When judges,
attorneys, and other court personnel help individuals consider
whether to opt for a problem solving court rehabilitative alterna-
tive instead of criminal court, they should rely on persuasion or
inducement, and avoid coercion and negative forms of pressure.
Of course, once the individual chooses the treatment option, her
future actions are constrained by the choice she has voluntarily en-
tered into. Thus, the individual, as a condition for accepting the
drug treatment court, may agree to attend a drug treatment pro-
gram, to remain drug-free, and to submit to periodic drug test-
ing. 1 1 The individual knows that if she fails to comply, the court
can apply sanctions (typically graduated sanctions) agreed to in ad-
vance by the individual." 2 Moreover, the individual knows that
repeated non-compliance can result in expulsion from the program
and return to criminal court, or a violation of probation if the indi-
vidual had pled guilty.' 03 While, in a manner of speaking, these
potential sanctions may pressure the individual to comply and even
induce her compliance, there is no need to regard this as coercion.
It is not legal coercion, and, if properly applied, the individual may
not even experienced it as psychologically coercive.
In this connection, problem solving court judges must under-
stand what makes people feel coerced and feel that they have acted
voluntarily. They should be aware of the implications of recent re-
search conducted on coercion by the MacArthur Research Net-
work on mental health and the law.'0 4 This research examined the
entering into a problem solving court program not only can compromise the defen-
dant's rights, but also can undermine the potential for treatment success. See Reisig,
supra, at 218-19, 221-23 (discussing the importance of a defendant's informed consent
and waiver); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4-5).
101. Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3).
102. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 528.
103. Id. at 478, 510.
104. Nancy S. Bennet et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith: The Morality of
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 295, 296-305 (1993);
William Gardener et al., Two Scales for Measuring Patient Perceptions of Coercion
During Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 307, 308-20 (1993); Steven K.
Hoge et al., Perceptions of Coercion in the Admission of Voluntary and Involuntary
Psychiatric Patients, 20 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 167, 170-81 (1997); Charles W. Lidz
et al., Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process, 52
ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1034, 1034 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion and
Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental Hospital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 249, 252-55 (1995) [hereinafter Monahan et al., Coercion and Committ-
ment]; John Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision of Mental Health Services: The
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causes and correlates of what makes people feel coerced. Con-
ducted in the context of mental patients facing involuntary hospi-
talization, this research concluded that even though patients were
subjected to legal compulsion through involuntary civil commit-
ment, they did not feel coerced when treated with dignity and re-
spect by people who they perceived as acting with genuine
benevolence, and as providing them with a sense of "voice" (the
ability to have their say), and with "validation" (the impression
that what they said was taken seriously). °5 This research also
showed that there is a correlation between the degrees of per-
ceived coercion, and the kinds of pressures that doctors, families,
and friends placed upon the patient. 10 6 Negative pressures, such as
threats and force, tend to make individuals feel coerced, whereas
positive pressures, such as persuasion and inducement, do not.10 7
Even though courts subject these individuals to the legal compul-
sion of civil commitment, if treated in these ways, they tend to not
feel coerced.
Problem solving court judges should apply the lessons of the
MacArthur research on coercion, treating all individuals appearing
before them with dignity and respect, and according them voice
and validation in the interactions they have with them. 8 They
should avoid negative pressures and threats, relying instead on pos-
itive pressures like persuasion and inducement. If they do so, it is
more likely that they will experience the treatment they have con-
sented to as voluntary, rather than coerced, and as a result, they
will experience the psychological benefits of choice, 10 9 and avoid
the negative psychological effects of coercion."10 People resent
others treating them as incompetent subjects of paternalism, and
suffer a diminished sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy when not
permitted to make decisions for themselves. 11' To the extent that
MacArthur Studies, in COERCION IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (J. Morrissey & John
Monahan eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-17, on file with authors) [hereinafter
Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision].
105. Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision, supra note 104 (manuscript at 12-
14, 17).
106. Id. (manuscript at 10-12, 17).
107. Id. (manuscript at 10-11, 17).
108. See Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1166-67.
109. See WINICK, RIGHT TO REFUSE, supra note 88, at 303, 327-44; Winick, Civil
Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 48-52; Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra
note 24 (manuscript at 38-39).
110. See Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1159.
111. ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL 12-13
(1997); Winick, Side Effects, supra note 90, at 6.
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the individual experiences her decision to participate in a problem
solving court treatment or rehabilitative program as voluntary, it
can have significant positive effects on treatment outcome.112
Therefore, problem solving court judges should avoid paternal-
ism and respect the individual's autonomy. They should encourage
and urge the individual to accept needed treatment or rehabilita-
tion. They should use techniques of persuasion or inducement, but
avoid a heavy-handed approach, strong negative pressure, and
coercion.
If handled properly by the problem solving court judge, conver-
sations about the need for treatment or rehabilitation can be an
opportunity for empowering the individual in ways that can have
positive psychological value. Such conversations can build self-es-
teem and self-efficacy, without which these individuals may not feel
they can succeed in what might be a long and difficult path to reha-
bilitation. These conversations can facilitate the individual's sense
that she has made a voluntary choice in favor of treatment, which
can increase her commitment to achieving the treatment goal, and
set in motion a variety of psychological mechanisms that can help
to bring it about.
C. Using Persuasion and Sparking Motivation
Persuasion, not coercion, should be the hallmark of judge-of-
fender interactions in problem solving court contexts. Involvement
in the judicial process itself can provide an important motivating
force that may prompt the individual to reexamine past patterns
and seek to undergo change. The process of attempting to per-
suade the individual in this direction often will occur in conversa-
tions with the individual's own defense attorney. 13 At times,
however, the judge will participate in the persuasion process
through conversations with the individual occurring in open court.
When such occasions present themselves, judges functioning in the
problem solving court context should remember that judicial con-
versations that are perceived by the individual as coercive may be
counterproductive, and that there is an important difference be-
tween coercion and persuasion.114
112. See Michele Cascardi et al., Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commit-
ment: An Analogy Study, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 731, 736-38 (2000); Winick, Civil Com-
mitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 40-41, 48.
113. See Astrid Birgden, Dealing with the Resistant Criminal Client: A Psychologi-
cally-Minded Strategy for More Effective Legal Counseling, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 225,
226-29, 232-39 (2002); Winick, Redefining, supra note 87, at 1049-51.
114. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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When the context calls for the judge to attempt to persuade the
individual to accept treatment or rehabilitation, the judge's under-
standing of the social psychology of persuasion will augment her
ability to be an effective persuader."15 This body of psychological
research identifies three elements of the persuasion process as criti-
cal-source, message, and receiver.116 The content of the message,
and the way it is delivered, significantly influence the likelihood of
persuasion.
Persuasion theory has postulated an elaboration likelihood
model, which asserts that certain persuasive elements are influ-
enced by the extent to which the receiver of information is actively
involved in the processing of the information presented." l7 Under
this theory, when the individual receiving the information has a
high likelihood of elaboration, this will maximize the potential for
successful persuasion, for example, when they engage in issue-rele-
vant thinking about the content of the message itself. It is more
likely that a judge will be successful in persuading individuals if the
message has personal relevance to them and they have prior
knowledge about the issue.
118
Individuals facing criminal charges wish to minimize the risk of
imprisonment, so they will value strategies that can achieve this
result. Problem solving courts should present them with informa-
tion concerning the rehabilitative alternatives to criminal court that
they present, as well as the positive consequences for successfully
completing the program, including, in many cases, the dismissal of
charges. Then, judges should leave them free to engage in instru-
mental thinking concerning the value of electing these rehabilita-
tive alternatives. Judges should also give these individuals the
opportunity to ask questions about their options, the freedom to
engage in their own processing of the information, and the freedom
to reach their own decision. Additionally, they should fully en-
courage individuals facing criminal charges to discuss their options
115. See DANIEL J. O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 134 (1990);
see also RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUA-
SION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986) (discussing
the use of central and peripheral persuasion in communication as a method of chang-
ing people); Winick, Legal Counseling, supra note 75, at 915-17.
116. See O'KEEFE, supra note 115, at 130-88.
117. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 115, at 1-60.
118. See Wendy Wood, Retrieval of Attitude-Relevant Information From Memory:
Effects on Susceptibility to Persuasion and on Intrinsic Motivation, 42 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 798, 799-800 (1982); Wendy Wood & Carl A. Kallgren, Communica-
tor Attributes and Persuasion: Recipients' Access to Attitude-Relevant Information in
Memory, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 172, 172-73 (1988).
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with counsel, and provide them with a reasonable opportunity to
see counsel and think about their choices. This form of persuasion,
known as "central route" persuasion, 19 can be more effective than
pressuring the individual to make a decision, and can allow her to
internalize the rehabilitative goal and increase the intrinsic motiva-
tion needed to accomplish it.
The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion is similar to the
motivational interviewing technique developed for use by clinicians
to help motivate individuals to deal with problems of addiction and
alcoholism. 120 Thus, problem solving court judges should also
master the techniques of motivational interviewing. Although
treatment staff' 2' and the individual's own attorney 122 will be pri-
marily involved in conducting such motivational interviews, occa-
sionally problem solving court judges will personally engage in
such interviews. Likewise, judges will have the opportunity to rein-
force the motivational effects of interviews conducted by the treat-
ment staff or defense attorney.
Five basic principles underlie this technique.' 23 First, the inter-
viewer needs to express empathy.' 24 This involves understanding
the individual's feelings and perspectives without judging, criticiz-
ing, or blaming. 125 Second, the interviewer, in a non-confronta-
tional way, should seek to develop discrepancies between the
individual's present behavior and important personal goals. 26 Ap-
plying this approach, the judge should attempt to elicit the individ-
ual's underlying goals and objectives.12 In addition, the judge
should attempt to get the individual to recognize the existence of a
problem through the use of interviewing techniques, such as open-
ended questioning, reflective listening, providing frequent state-
ments of affirmation and support, and eliciting self-motivational
statements. 128 For example, if the individual wishes to obtain or
keep a particular job, the judge can ask questions designed to
probe the relationship between her drinking or substance abuse
and her poor performance in previous employment that may have
119. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 115, at 3-11.
120. WILLIAM R. MILLER & STEPHEN ROLLNICK, MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING:
PREPARING PEOPLE TO CHANGE ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 51-63 (1991).
121. See Clark, Drug Courts, supra note 65 (manuscript at 23-27).
122. See Birgden, supra note 113, at 237.
123. MILLER & ROLLNICK, supra note 120, at 55-62.
124. Id. at 55-56.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 56-58.
127. Id.
128. See id. (describing the general goal of eliciting discrepancies).
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resulted in dismissal. An interviewer will create motivation for
change only when individuals perceive the discrepancy between
how they are behaving and the achievement of their personal goals.
Third, the interviewer should avoid arguing with the individual,
which can be counter productive and create defensiveness. 29
Fourth, when resistance is encountered, the interviewer should at-
tempt to roll with the resistance, rather than becoming confronta-
tional. 130 This requires listening with empathy and providing
feedback to what the individual is saying by introducing new infor-
mation, which also allows the individual to remain in control, to
make her own decisions, and to create solutions to her problems.
Fifth, it is important for the interviewer to foster self-efficacy in
the individual. The individual will not attempt change unless she
feels that she can reach the goal, overcome barriers and obstacles
to its achievement, and succeed in effectuating change. 3 '
Problem solving court judges, court officials, treatment profes-
sionals working with them, and lawyers counseling clients about
their options to enter into problem solving court rehabilitative pro-
grams should learn the techniques of motivational interviewing and
apply them in their conversations with offenders. These motiva-
tional interviewing techniques have recently been adapted for ap-
plication by criminal defense lawyers dealing with clients who have
recurring problems, are in denial about their problems, and are re-
sistant to change.' 32 Additionally, in mental health courts, the
techniques have been adapted to apply to lawyers representing cli-
ents, mental health professionals, and mental health court
judges. 33 These techniques can be particularly effective when the
individual finds herself in a situation where change is being con-
templated.'34 The individual's arrest and need to face criminal
charges can present the pressures needed to create such a teacha-
ble moment or therapeutic opportunity in which the individual is
ready to contemplate change, accept responsibility for wrongdoing,
and consider making a genuine commitment to rehabilitation. The
129. Id. at 58-59.
130. Id. at 59-60.
131. Id. at 60-62.
132. See Birgden, supra note 113, at 232-42.
133. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 38-42).
134. See JAMES 0. PROCHASKA & JOHN C. NORCROSS, SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOTHER-
APY: A TRANSTHEORETICAL ANALYSIS 109-39 (1994); Birgden, supra note 113, at
240-41; James 0. Prochaska et al., In Search of How People Change: Applications to
Addictive Behaviors, 47 A. PSYCHOL. 1102, 1108-12 (1992); James 0. Prochaska & J.
M. Prochaska, Why Don't Continents Move? Why Don't People Change?, 9 J. PSY-
CHOTHERAPY INTEG. 83, 83-102 (1999).
2003] 1081
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
use of motivational interviewing and related psychological strate-
gies as a means to sparking and maintaining the individual's moti-
vation to accept needed treatment can substantially increase the
potential of problem-solving courts to help the individual solve her
problem.
D. Increasing Compliance
Once the individual has made the decision to enter into a treat-
ment program under the auspices of the problem solving court, the
judge's focus should shift to the question of how to assure the indi-
vidual's compliance with the requirements of the treatment pro-
gram. A body of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship has
examined how to increase compliance in a variety of legal con-
texts. 35 This work has analyzed the adaptation of health care com-
pliance principles and methods of behavioral or contingency
contracting to legal contexts and has explored the implications of
the psychology of procedural justice for improving compliance with
judicial orders. These approaches can easily be adapted for appli-
cation in the context of problem solving courts.
1. Health Care Compliance Principles
A parallel problem arises in the context of medical practice-
how can physicians and other healers convince their patients to
comply with their medical advice? Patient non-compliance is a sig-
nificant problem that has been addressed extensively in the medi-
cal literature.' 36 Behavioral medicine, a field of medical practice
that builds on principles of behavioral psychology, offers much
help for the resolution of this problem.1 37 For example, the work
of psychologists Donald Meichenbaum and Donald Turk sets forth
a number of health care compliance principles, and shows how they
can be applied by health care professionals to increase the likeli-
135. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity
Acquitee Conditional Release Process [hereinafter Wexler, Health Care], in WEXLER
& WINICK, supra note 41, at 199, 208-1.7; Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 740-88;
Winick, Redefining, supra note 87, at 1062; David B. Wexler, How the Law Can Use
What Works: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Look at Recent Research on Rehabilitation,
15 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 365, 367-70 (1997) (book review).
136. See, e.g., DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREAT-
MENT ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK 149-84 (1987).
137. See id. (discussing the theory and practice of behavioral medicine).
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hood that their patients will follow their treatment
recommendations. 3
8
Patients frequently fail to comply with treatment recommenda-
tions when the physician or other health care professional fails to
instruct them adequately concerning the treatment they are asked
to follow. 139 The way the health care professional interacts with
the patient during the period when treatment is explained can be
most significant. 140 If the physician appears to be distant, dis-
tracted, reads case notes, uses professional jargon, asks questions
calling for brief "yes" or "no" answers, fails to allow the patient the
opportunity to tell her story in her own words, describes the treat-
ment plan imprecisely or in technical terms, acts paternalistically,
or is abrupt with the patient, compliance with the health care pro-
fessional's treatment recommendations will be less likely.' 4'
To increase treatment adherence, Meichenbaum & Turk recom-
mend that the health care provider introduce herself to the patient,
avoid jargon, and elicit the patient's views, preferences, and active
involvement in designing the treatment plan.142 Providing patient
choice even concerning minor details of treatment can be signifi-
cant in increasing compliance. 143 Moreover, adherence is furthered
when the physician is perceived as prestigious, competent, caring,
and motivated by the patient's best interests. 4 4 Involving family
members and others significant to the patient can also increase
compliance.'45 These individuals can provide encouragement and
reminders to the patient and can help the physician access informa-
tion about compliance. 146 Furthermore, when the patient makes a
public commitment concerning the treatment plan to significant
others, compliance is more likely to occur than when the patient's
commitment is privately made. 14 The anticipated disapproval of a
respected physician and of the patient's family members, as well as
138. Id.; see Wexler, Health Care, supra note 135, at 199 (discussing health care
compliance principles and their application by criminal judges making insanity acquit-
tee conditional release decisions).
139. See Meichenbaum & Turk, supra note 136, at 55-60.
140. See id. at 78.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 81.
143. Id. at 171.
144. Id. at 172.
145. Id. at 124.
146. Id. at 162.
147. Id. at 173-75 (discussing the making of formal commitments through a written
instrument).
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her own anticipated self-disapproval, can significantly increase the
patient's motivation to comply.'48
These health care compliance principles can be adapted for use
by judges in problem solving courts. Judges, court personnel, treat-
ment providers, and defense attorneys, should take care to instruct
the individual carefully and understandably concerning her obliga-
tions relating to participation in the treatment program and report-
ing to court. The judge should act concerned rather than distant,
provide the individual with her undivided attention during conver-
sations, avoid jargon, allow the individual an opportunity for voice,
avoid paternalism, and generally treat the individual with respect.
At the outset, the judge should encourage the individual's active
involvement in both the negotiation and design of the rehabilita-
tive plan, providing as great a degree of choice concerning the de-
tails as is possible in the circumstances. The judge should treat the
individual with dignity and respect, conveying to the individual that
her actions are motivated by the individual's best interests. When-
ever possible, the judge should seek to involve family members and
significant others in the process during which the individual makes
a commitment to participate in treatment, and that commitment
should be made in a formal and relatively public way.
2. Behavioral Contracting
A behavioral psychology technique known as "behavioral con-
tracting" or "contingency management" captures many of these
compliance principles and may be helpful in insuring the individ-
ual's compliance with the treatment or rehabilitative program. 49
Under this technique, an explicit, formal contract is entered into
between the parties in which specific goals are set forth. 5 " Motiva-
tion to achieve the goal is facilitated through contract terms pro-
viding for a combination of agreed-upon rewards or positive
reinforcers for success or aversive conditioners for failure. 5' This
technique is frequently used in clinical practice, and the combina-
tion of positive reinforcement to encourage compliance and aver-
sive conditioning to decrease or extinguish non-compliant behavior
148. Id.
149. See Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91, at 772-89, 793-97 (advocating the adop-
tion of a wager system to cure social ills such as drug addiction, unproductivity in
government employment, and repeat criminal offenses, which borrows heavily from
behavioral conditioning theory and uses both positive and negative reinforcement).
150. Id. at 780-89.
151. Id. at 779-81.
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can be quite effective.1 52 The behavioral contract provides rewards
and penalties for the achievement and failure to reach intermediate
and long-term goals.'5 3 Partial rewards or sanctions can be pro-
vided periodically as intermediate goals that are measured at fre-
quent intervals are either achieved or missed, thereby facilitating
the progressive shaping of the individual's behavior. 54 Tailoring
the rewards and punishments to the individual's incentive prefer-
ences, and involving the individual in the process of selecting the
goals and reinforcers, when practicable, can significantly increase
motivation to comply.1 55 Such sub-goals will best maintain self-mo-
tivation, provide inducements to action, provide guideposts for
performance, and, if attained, will produce self-satisfaction needed
to sustain effort. 156
The behavioral contract makes explicit the expectations of eve-
ryone involved. Target behaviors are objectified, measurable, and
well understood by all parties. The setting of explicit goals is itself
a significant factor in their achievement.' 57 The behavioral con-
tract is a successful method of ensuring compliance, in part, be-
cause of the goal-setting effect, 158 which posits that the mere
setting of a goal produces positive expectancies for its achievement
that themselves help to bring about success.159 Goals serve to
structure and guide the individual's performance, providing direc-
tion and focusing interest, attention, and personal involvement.
The behavioral contract also engages other mechanisms of psychol-
ogy that help to achieve effective performance, including intrinsic
motivation, cognitive dissonance, and the psychological value of
choice. 60
Such behavioral contracts are explicitly used in many drug court
treatment programs. 16' Whether or not formally negotiated and
executed, individuals agreeing to participate in treatment or reha-
152. Id. at 780-81.
153. Id. at 758-59.
154. Id. at 748 n.31, 758 n.66 (defining shaping as the breaking down of a desired
behavior into smaller easier to understand steps).
155. Id. at 780-88.
156. Id. at 758.
157. Id. at 761.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 761-70.
161. See William M. Burdon et al., Drug Courts and Contingency Management, 31
J. DRUG IssuEs 73, 74, 78-81 (2001); David Carson, Civil Proceedings: Legal
Frameworks for Psychology's Contribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN
LEGAL CONTEXTS 395, 406 (David Carson & Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. 1995); Simon,
supra note 1, at 452; Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4).
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bilitation in a variety of problem solving court contexts are, in ef-
fect, engaging in behavioral contracting. 62 Offenders that agree to
participate in reentry courts and to submit to supervision by the
reentry court judge are also engaging in behavioral contracting. 63
Domestic violence perpetrators who agree to enter a batterer's in-
tervention program as a condition of bail, diversion, or probation
are, in effect, engaging in behavioral contracting with the domestic
violence court.'64 Individuals with mental illnesses in mental
health court who agree to accept treatment in the community as a
condition for diversion from the criminal court similarly are engag-
ing in behavioral contracting with the mental health court. 65
These contracts should be explicitly negotiated, written, and agreed
to by both the court and the individual in a formal and public way.
Judges in these problem solving courts should understand the
psychology of behavioral contracting, and how it can be used to
increase motivation, commitment, compliance, and effective per-
formance. Behavioral contracting also increases the satisfaction of
people involved in problem solving court programs. 66 Moreover,
the process through which the behavioral contract is negotiated
and entered into can itself provide an important opportunity for
minimizing feelings of coercion that might undermine compliance
and successful performance. 167
Rather than rushing through the process in which the individual
is asked to make an election in favor of drug treatment court or
another problem solving court rehabilitative program, 68 the prob-
lem solving court process should regard the individual's decision
and the behavioral contract as a significant opportunity for reduc-
ing feelings of coercion and inspiring the perception of voluntary
choice. As the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health
and the Law research shows, according individuals a sense of voice
and validation, treating them with dignity and respect, and convey-
ing to them that the court is acting in good faith and in their best
interest will diminish the perception of coercion and increase the
162. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36).
163. See LaFond & Winick, supra note 15 (manuscript at 16-17).
164. See Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 41-42.
165. See Winick, Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 5).
166. See Adele V. Harrell, Address at the Eleventh Annual Symposium on Con-
temporary Urban Challenges at the Fordham University School of Law (Mar. 1,
2002), in Problem Solving Courts: Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence,
supra note 93, at 1933-36.
167. See Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1147.
168. See Quinn, supra note 100, at 47; Reisig, supra note 100, at 220.
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perception of voluntary choice.'6 9 Individuals opting for a problem
solving court rehabilitative program should be reminded that the
choice is entirely up to them. In addition, they should be given the
opportunity, when practicable, to participate in the negotiation of
the behavioral contract and the selection of the reinforcers, sanc-
tions, and conditions that will be used and applied. This participa-
tion and involvement should occur in ways that respect their need
for voice and validation. If handled properly, the negotiation and
entry into the behavioral contract can constitute an important op-
portunity to engage intrinsic motivation and commitment and to
establish a mechanism that will help to assure compliance in ways
that the individual will regard as fair.
By requiring an individual accepting drug treatment court to
agree to periodic drug testing and reporting to court, the drug
treatment court is monitoring compliance with the behavioral con-
tract. When the drug test shows the individual to be drug-free, the
drug treatment court judge praises the individual, often in the pres-
ence of a room full of attorneys, court personnel, and other drug
treatment court participants. Such praise is an important form of
positive reinforcement that rewards the individual for compliant
behavior, helps to shape future behavior, and builds much needed
self-esteem and self-efficacy. At the successful completion of the
drug treatment court program, the individual is given a graduation
ceremony in court where the arresting officer usually presents a
"diploma," the judge offers praise, and there is general applause.'
When other program participants observe this "graduation" ritual,
they themselves receive a form of vicarious reinforcement. 17 1
When the individual's drug test is positive, the judge applies an
agreed-upon sanction or aversive conditioner, which is designed to
deter future non-compliant behavior.7 2 Future incidents of non-
compliance are then subjected to graduated sanctions that were
agreed to in advance by the individual, as well as verbal disap-
proval, occurring in the presence of others. 73 The court maintains
169. Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision, supra note 104 (manuscript at 12-
14, 17); Winick, Mental Health, supra note 88, at 1166-67.
170. Steven Belenko, Diverting Drug Offenders to Treatment Courts: The Portland
Experience, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INTERVEN-
TION, supra note 4, at 108, 127-28.
171. See Albert Bandura, Social Learning Through Imitation, in NEBRASKA SYMPO-
SIUM ON MOTIVATION 211, 211-13 (M. Jones ed., 1962); Winick, Harnessing, supra
note 91, at 749.
172. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 528.
173. Id.
2003] 1087
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
close monitoring and supervision of the treatment process by hav-
ing the individual report to the court every ten to fourteen days, so
that the judge may receive frequent feedback from the treatment
team and information concerning whether the individual has re-
mained drug-free. 174
The periodic delivery of positive reinforcement or sanctions con-
tingent upon whether the individual has met intermediate goals
helps to maintain the individual's commitment and motivation dur-
ing the one and one-half to two years that drug treatment court
typically requires. In this way, what the drug treatment court does
can be seen as an application of behavioral contracting or contin-
gency management, a technique which, if properly applied, can
substantially increase the likelihood of treatment success.'75 Other
problem solving courts should adapt this approach and all judges in
these courts should receive training in its application.
3. The Psychology of Procedural Justice
In all of their interactions with the individual, problem solving
court judges should be careful to apply procedures that fully re-
spect the individual's participatory and dignitary interests. 76 Ther-
apeutic jurisprudence scholarship has frequently pointed to the
literature on the psychology of procedural justice, 177 suggesting
that its application in a variety of contexts can achieve therapeutic
benefits for the individuals involved. 78 This literature, based on
174. Id. at 475.
175. See Burdon et al., supra note 161, at 73-90; Winick, Harnessing, supra note 91,
at 799-808.
176. See Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 53, 57-58.
177. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTiCE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
178. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice and Voluntary Participa-
tion: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CINN. L. REV. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 23-35, on file with author) (discussing the application of
therapeutic jurisprudence to juvenile offenders); Amy D. Runner & Bruce J. Winick,
Silencing the Appellant's Voice: The Antitherapeutic Per Curiam Affirmance, 24 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 499, 504 (2000); Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at
53, 57-58; Winick, Domestic Violence, supra note 12, at 33; Winick, Outpatient Com-
mitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 8); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the
1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 537,
565-66 (1998); Bruce J. Winick & Ginger Lerner-Wren, Do Juveniles Facing Civil
Commitment Have a Right to Counsel?: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Brief, 71 U.
CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3-5, on file with author) (discussing the
application of the psychology of procedural justice in the context of juveniles in foster
care under state custody when the state seeks to transfer them to residential treat-
ment centers); Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2-7) (discussing drug
treatment court proceedings); see also Amend. R. of Juv. Proc., Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350,
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empirical work in a variety of litigation and arbitration contexts,
shows that if people are treated with dignity and respect at hear-
ings, given a sense of "voice," (the ability to tell their story) and
"validation" (the feeling that what they have said has been taken
seriously by the judge or hearing officer), and generally treated in
ways that they consider to be fair, they will experience greater sat-
isfaction and comply more willingly with the ultimate outcome of
the proceedings, even if adverse to them.
Thus, according individuals in problem solving court contexts a
full measure of procedural justice can help to increase compliance
with and successful participation in a treatment or rehabilitative
program. For reasons developed earlier, according individuals pro-
cedural justice will also diminish their perception of coercion in the
judicial process and increase the chances that they will experience
the decision to enter into a treatment or rehabilitative program as
having been voluntarily made. 79 The resulting perception can it-
self help to increase the likelihood of genuine participation on the
part of the individual, intrinsic motivation, program compliance,
and treatment success.18 0 These utilitarian reasons for respecting
the procedural rights of individuals in problem solving court con-
texts coalesce with the historic commitment to fairness embodied
in the concept of due process of law.18' Even when functioning as
psychosocial agencies, problem solving courts should accord the in-
dividual a full measure of due process.
CONCLUSION
Therapeutic jurisprudence can contribute much to the function-
ing of problem solving courts, which can provide rich and fascinat-
ing laboratories to generate and refine therapeutic jurisprudence
approaches. Considerably more research is needed on the func-
tioning of problem solving courts and their effectiveness in rehabil-
itating offenders and avoiding recidivism. To the extent that these
804 So. 2d 1206, 1210-11 (2001) (recognizing psychology of procedural justice as pro-
viding a therapeutic jurisprudence basis for adopting rule allowing children facing
civil commitment to be represented by counsel).
179. See supra notes 86-112 and accompanying text (discussing the MacArthur Re-
search Network on Mental Health and the Law research on the causes and correlates
of perceived coercion).
180. See Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 47, at 48-49, 60; Winick,
Outpatient Commitment, supra note 24 (manuscript at 30-31); Winick & Wexler, supra
note 4 (manuscript at 4-5).
181. See Reisig, supra note 100, at 216-19; Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing,
supra note 47, at 38, 44-47.
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courts are successful, as the preliminary research and many anec-
dotal reports suggest, there is considerable need to understand why
they work and more research is needed on this question. The inter-
action between the problem solving court judge and the individual
seems to be an important ingredient in program success, and more
empirical work should probe how this occurs. 182
This Essay has offered a number of suggestions concerning how
judges should act in problem solving court contexts to spark the
motivation of the individual to achieve rehabilitation and to in-
crease compliance with treatment. These proposals are derived
from psychological literature in other contexts, therefore, further
analytical analysis and empirical research are needed concerning
the application of these principles in the problem solving court
arena.
Problem solving courts are a noble undertaking. They represent
a newly broadened conception of the role of the courts, one that is
fully consistent with the basic concept of therapeutic jurisprudence.
To perform this role effectively, judges need to develop and im-
prove their interpersonal, psychological, and social work skills.
Therapeutic jurisprudence can help judges in this effort. Problem
solving courts can become natural laboratories for the develop-
ment and application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles and
for research on what works best in the court-involved treatment
and rehabilitative process. Therapeutic jurisprudence and problem
solving courts share a common mission-how legal rules, judicial
practices, and court structures and administration can be rede-
signed to facilitate the rehabilitative process. Problem solving
courts, applying principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, can be-
come an important force for dealing with a number of the most
vexing social and psychological problems that affect our communi-
ties. Although problem solving courts are not identical with thera-
peutic jurisprudence, these two approaches can be seen as having a
symbiotic relationship. 18 3 Together they can do much to transform
law into an instrument of healing for both the individual and the
community.
182. See Petrucci, supra note 59, at 294-95 (acknowledging importance of judge-
defendant interaction and recommending future research).
183. See Winick & Wexler, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2).
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SPECIALIZED COURTS: NOT A CURE-ALL
Phylis Skloot Bamberger*
INTRODUCTION
Discussion of judicial problem solving in criminal cases through
specialized courts is, in reality, a discussion about alternatives to
incarceration and the administration of those alternatives.' Judicial
efforts to avoid inappropriate incarceration by the use of suitable
alternative programs is old stuff. It has been going on at least since
the advent of the probation system. The story of how New York
added pre-trial and pre-sentence programs to post-conviction im-
prisonment alternatives, and went from probation to specialized
courts is well documented.2 In the last few years, the focus in many
state judicial systems has been on specialized courts to provide the
response to societal problems that arise in courts with criminal
dockets, including administration of alternatives to incarceration.3
The most well-known of these problem solving courts having crimi-
nal case jurisdiction are drug courts and domestic violence courts.
Other courts of specialized jurisdiction have also been suggested or
funded. These courts are given unique resources and staffing to
* Judge, Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County.
1. There are other specialized courts. For example, community courts are con-
cerned with matters in addition to docketed cases, and compliance courts deal only
with cases in which the defendant is already in a program. See Michael Scrhunk &
Judith Phelan, Problem Solving Courts, 41 JUDGES J., Winter 2002, at 17. There are
also specialized courts for trying felony cases like those in which juveniles are tried.
This Essay deals only with specialized courts that are specially staffed, and have ac-
cess to special services to allow non-incarceratory dispositions.
2. See N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF ACTION UNIT No. 7, at 31-57 (1998)
[hereinafter STATE BAR]; N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS & THE COURTS, CON-
FRONTING THE CYCLE OF ADDICTION AND RECIDIVISM 10 (2000) [hereinafter FISKE
REPORT]; N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF COURT DRUG TREATMENT, THE FIRST YEAR: RE-
PORT TO CHIEF JUDGE KAYE AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE JONATHAN L.
LIPPMAN (2002) [hereinafter FIRST YEAR]; N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., RE-
PORT OF THE UNITED COURT SYSTEMS COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS 16 (1995) [hereinafter UNIFIED COURT] (detailing, inter alia, the need to
reduce the burdens on probation courts which has given rise to more specialized
courts); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Report on Alternatives to Incarceration
and Probation, 49 REC. 376 (1994) [hereinafter City Bar] (in 1985, the New York
State Division of Probation was reorganized as the Division of Probation and Correc-
tional Alternatives to meet the increasing demand for specialized amounts of proba-
tionary contact).
3. See FISKE REPORT, supra note 2, at 35 n.81 (discussing alternatives to incarcer-
ation in Drug Courts).
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administer post-plea sentences that are alternatives to incarcera-
tion. They are given access to the professional delivery of diagno-
sis, screening, and assessment services not generally available to
courts of general jurisdiction, as well as to the programs that pro-
vide the services.4 Specialized courts are part of the continuing ef-
fort to avoid putting people in jail or prison when something less
drastic will work to the advantage of the defendant and the public,
satisfying concerns of humane treatment and reducing the costs of
punishment.
Traditionally, the courts of general criminal jurisdiction, how-
ever, have assumed the role of administering pre-trial and pre-sen-
tence programs, funded both publicly and privately, that provide
education, vocational training, counseling, and substance abuse re-
habilitation. And historically, when a non-incarceratory sentence
is imposed, probation departments have played the administrative
role, selecting the appropriate program, supervising compliance,
and acting as liaison with the court when problems arise needing
judicial intervention.5
The focus on specialized courts requires reexamination of fund-
ing and staffing of courts of general jurisdiction to administer alter-
natives to incarceration. General jurisdiction courts have the
authority, at any point in the proceeding, to involve probation eli-
gible defendants who do not come within the scope of the work of
specialized courts in alternate programs. Thus, despite the shift to
specialized courts, the general jurisdiction judges are left with the
administrative responsibility for initiating, effectuating, and moni-
toring alternates to incarceration, and the responsibility of super-
vising defendants who are in pre-trial programs as alternatives to
jail detention and post-conviction/ pre-sentencing alternatives to
prison.
Further, in recent years there has been insufficient funding and
staffing of probation services, which, in New York State, is mostly
the responsibility of the counties.6 According to a recent report by
the New York State Commission on Drugs and the Courts,
4. See id. at 34.
5. See id. at 75 (discussing the role of probation in drug courts).
6. New York State's probation system is organized on a countywide basis; there is
one system, however, for New York City. The New York State Division of Probation
and Alternatives to Incarceration exercises general supervision over local probation
systems and contributes matching funds to local offices. See id. at 76; City Bar, supra
note 2, at 398. Furthermore, state funding to local departments has declined and the
caseloads have skyrocketed. See UNIFIED COURT, supra note 2, at 17-18; see also
FISKE, RiPORT, supra note 2, at 76-77.
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"[p]robation departments are often underfunded and beset with
enormous caseloads which make effective supervision a virtual im-
possibility. Indeed, in many respects some of the treatment inno-
vations that are described in this Report have arisen to fill the gaps
left by the failure of traditional probation supervision. 7 While cre-
ation, funding, and support of some specialized courts are appro-
priate, my view from the bench is that all courts should be provided
with the panoply of services, including a properly funded probation
department, so that alternatives to jail or prison are equally availa-
ble to all defendants found eligible for them, regardless of the
court before which their cases are pending. While specialized
courts, such as drug courts, dealing with defendants charged with
crimes are of critical importance, I believe that sole or even pri-
mary reliance on specialized courts is not sufficient. Rather, for
the reasons that follow, what should be done is to make centralized
resources available as necessary to all courts in a county or city in
which alternatives to incarceration are possible, although not
automatic.
I. THE POPULATION DEPENDENT ON COURTS OF GENERAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
There are defendants who, for various reasons, are not serviced
by specialized courts. Such defendants must seek probation and
jail or prison alternatives from the general jurisdiction judges
before whom their cases are pending. The defendants include those
seeking pre-plea and pre-sentence alternatives to jail, all those
seeking a sentence alternative to prison, but who are not in the
target population of a specialized court, and all those who choose
not to seek early diversion from the traditional court processes into
the specialized court.
Offenders who are addicted or substance abusers are the most
well-known target population of the specialized court system. Tak-
ing specialized drug courts as an example, in New York, the target
population is defendants, nineteen years old or older, charged with
possession or sale of drugs in an amount below the drug weight
needed for the most serious felony drug charge, provided the of-
fense did not occur on certain days and times within a thousand
feet of a school, and provided the defendants have no prior felony
conviction.8 Defendants in the target group who pass a screening
7. FiSKE REPORT, supra note 2, at 75.
8. See id. at 34.
1093
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
review are placed in substance rehabilitation programs, given in-
tense supervision, and appear regularly before a judge.9
There are, however, many cases in which defendants who are
addicts are excluded from specialized courts because they have
prior convictions, are charged with crimes other than drug law of-
fenses, have sold drugs within a thousand feet of a school at the
requisite time, or who have other disqualifying factors. Many
would benefit from participation in a program under strict supervi-
sion without posing a danger to the community. Their cases re-
main pending before judges of general jurisdiction.'" In addition,
there are defendants who are substance abusers or addicts who
would be excluded from some, although not all, drug courts be-
cause they have problems other than addiction. People addicted to
drugs may also have heart conditions, asthma, AIDS, positive re-
sults for HIV, learning disabilities, emotional disturbances, mental
illness, retardation, syndromes from physical or sexual abuse, illit-
eracy, infirmities from old age, an absence of any marketable skills,
and homelessness. These cases remain in general jurisdiction
courts where the judge must determine whether to order an alter-
native to jail or prison in these difficult cases.
Further, specialized drug courts do not reach those defendants
who are not addicts, but who do have one or more of the other
problems listed above. People charged with crimes who appear
before courts of general jurisdiction have such a vast array of
problems and needs that, for the most part, there is not a special-
ized court for each of these separable groups. It is apparent that if
specialized courts were established to respond to the needs of each
of these groups, an expensive infrastructure and costly staffing
would be required in a single court for a comparatively small, al-
though important, population needing help. Defendants with these
problems are before the many general jurisdiction judges, who will
be the administrators for any pre-sentence program alternative to
jail.
Finally, defendants who are eligible for help in a specialized
court may choose not to take that option because it comes very
early in the processing of the case. The premise of many of the
specialized courts is early diversion, and, as noted, a guilty plea by
the defendant is required within a short time after the case is com-
menced in order that the defendant may take advantage of the pro-
9. See id. at 33.
10. See id. at 34-35.
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gram offer. I I If no plea is entered early in the proceedings, the
defendant goes through the usual court processes.
While the goal of prompt intervention is often an appropriate
consideration for treatment therapy, the defendant has a right to
make a thoughtful, voluntary, and knowing decision about whether
to plead guilty and take the treatment route. And the defendant
has a right to make such a decision after consultation with a lawyer
who has information about the pending case. At the early stage in
the proceedings, when the specialized court begins intervention,
counsel often does not have very much information about the accu-
sations and the case, has had virtually no discovery or police
paperwork, and does not know what issues may be present in the
case, as, for example, if there is any basis to challenge the admissi-
bility of the evidence against the defendant, or if there is a defense
to the charges. Counsel's advice is particularly significant if the
plea is to a felony. There is the risk that the felony guilty plea will
remain on the defendant's record if the defendant does not com-
plete the program. Further, because only the prosecutor can au-
thorize a reduction in a charge, the plea arrangement may require
the defendant to plead to a felony, albeit one not requiring a prison
term, even if the defendant successfully completes the program.
12
Even entry of a misdemeanor plea has collateral consequences for
the defendant, and she should be advised by counsel of the conse-
quences. When the defendant chooses to exercise constitutional or
statutory rights and remain in the court of general jurisdiction, that
judge will determine if the alternate sentence is appropriate.
The First Year Report to New York's Chief Administrative
Judge concludes that most participants in drug court programs
"face severe socioeconomic disadvantages, posing a substantial
challenge to rehabilitation efforts and highlighting the importance
of supplemental vocational educational or employment ser-
vices... .,13 The needs of many non-addicted people with criminal
cases before the general jurisdiction courts are comparable to those
who are addicted. All courts that people come before should be
aided in their efforts to provide appropriate supportive alternative
programs.
11. See id. at 37.
12. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(3)-(4) (McKinney 2002). In addition, under
recent federal law, a guilty plea can result in deportation for a non-citizen. See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(2) (1999).
13. FIRST YEAR, supra note 2, at 9.
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II. CASES WHERE PROBLEM SOLVING DISPOSITIONS ARE
AVAILABLE TO CRIMINAL COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION
Problem solving when dealing with felony cases is directly af-
fected by the sentencing structure. Many states, including New
York, require mandatory prison sentences for many felonies. In
New York, the mandatory sentence can be either a determinate or
indeterminate sentence, depending on whether the crime is defined
as a violent felony.1 4 Mandatory sentences are enhanced if the
convicted person is a predicate felony offender,15 or a persistent,
violent felony offender. 6
Even within this legal framework of required incarceration, de-
fendants are eligible for non-incarceratory sentences. Judges of
general felony and misdemeanor courts can provide alternatives to
incarceration for these probation-eligible defendants who are not
eligible for processing and sentencing by specialized courts.
Referring to New York as an example, a judge handling felony
cases is able to provide an alternative to incarceration in three situ-
ations: when the defendant is eligible for youth offender adjudica-
tion; when the defendant is charged with a felony requiring
incarceration, but the prosecutor agrees that the defendant will be
allowed to plead to a lesser charge carrying a non-incarceratory
sentence;' 7 and when the defendant is charged with a crime, and
probation is a permissible sentence.
A. Youth Offender Adjudication
Under New York law, a defendant who is at least sixteen , and
not more than nineteen years old at the time the crime is commit-
ted, and who has not been previously convicted of a felony, or pre-
viously adjudicated a youth offender, is eligible for youth offender
adjudication.' An eligible youth charged with a felony may be ad-
judicated a youth offender in the court's discretion, "[i]f in the
opinion of the court the interest of justice would be served by re-
lieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and by
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(6), 70.02 (McKinney 2002).
15. Id. §§ 70.04, 70.06.
16. Id. § 70.08.
17. Id. § 220.10(3)-(4).
18. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10(1)-(2) (McKinney 1995). There are excep-
tions for certain crimes, but even as to these crimes, the defendant is eligible if the
defendant was not the only participant in the crime, and her actions were minor, or
there are mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Id. § 720.10(2)(a)-
(3).
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not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than
four years ... ."19 The eligible youth charged with a misdemeanor
must be adjudicated a youth offender if she has not been previously
convicted of a crime or adjudicated a youth offender.20 The adjudi-
cation allows the court to impose a probation sentence, and to con-
dition probation upon the participation in a program as an
alternative to incarceration. If the defendant violates the condi-
tions of probation, an indeterminate prison sentence with a maxi-
mum of four years can be imposed.
In a court of general jurisdiction dealing with eligible youths who
are charged with felonies normally requiring imprisonment, there
are two stages at which the eligible youth can make a positive track
record to enable the judge to determine the appropriateness of
youthful offender adjudication and the imposition of probation
with a program as an alternative to incarceration. The first is prior
to conviction by plea or verdict. The second is after conviction. At
either of these times, the defendant can be ordered to attend edu-
cational, vocational training or substance abuse programs, psychi-
atric treatments, or other appropriate programs.2'
To the extent that the judge is uncertain as to whether the defen-
dant should be entitled to youth offender adjudication, the defen-
dant's participation in any assigned program and her general
behavior can provide the basis for the adjudication. Once one is
adjudicated a youth offender, if the judge makes the separate deci-
sion to impose a sentence of probation, participation in a program
can be made a condition.
B. The Prosecutor's Agreement
In some circumstances where incarceration is mandatory, the de-
fendant enters a plea of guilty to the felony requiring a prison sen-
tence because the prosecutor consents to allow the defendant to
remain out of custody, to participate in a program, and, on condi-
tion that the defendant completes the program, consents to allow
the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty to the charge requiring
imprisonment, and to plead guilty to a crime that permits a non-
incarceratory sentence. In Bronx County courts of general juris-
diction, arrangements for this disposition, except in drug cases, are
made by the judge acting with the defense counsel.
19. Id. § 720.20(1)(a).
20. See id. § 720.
21. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10.
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There are other cases where the prosecutor makes no initial
promise to consent to a plea to a reduced charge, but the defen-
dant, under court supervision, agrees to participate in a structured
out-patient or residential program of schooling, vocational training,
psychiatric counseling, or other suitable activity. In these cases, the
defendant agrees to delay the trial until she can make a track re-
cord and entry of a plea is delayed. Here, too, substantial efforts
are assumed by the judge to administer the arrangement. The
whole undertaking is pursued with the knowledge that the prosecu-
tor makes no promise to consent to the reduced plea or to a proba-
tion sentence and, in the end, may reject any such proposal. Yet,
there are cases in which the defendant makes a sustained and suc-
cessful effort in the program, supported by the interest of counsel
and under the supervision of the judge. In such circumstances, the
prosecutor may determine that it is appropriate to allow the defen-
dant to plead to a crime that will allow the imposition of a proba-
tion sentence. Once the sentence is imposed, monitoring and
supervision of the defendant rests with the probation department.
C. Crimes for which Probation is a Permissible Sentence
In New York, convictions for misdemeanors and some felonies
treated as non-violent by the penal law can result in probation, de-
terminate sentences of up to one year, or indeterminate sentences.
Where a choice is permissible, the option of imposing probation is
based in part on the judge's evaluation of the history and character
of the defendant. Where that history and character raise questions
as to the suitability of probation, or where the record is unclear,
the judge can order the defendant to participate in a program, and
monitor the progress as part of the evaluation. If the record, con-
sidering the probation department's pre-sentence report, leaves no
question, the judge can immediately impose probation. In the for-
mer circumstance, the judge undertakes the administration of the
defendant's participation in the program. In the latter circum-
stance, the probation department undertakes supervision, in accord
with the statute.
The possibility of probation for the felony of gun possession 22 is
an extremely important statutory provision given the number of
people charged with that offense, and the large number who can be
supervised on probation without any harm to the community.
22. Id. §§ 70.02(c)(ii), 265.02(4)-(8).
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Il. METHODS OF PROBLEM SOLVING IN GENERAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION COURTS: A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
The importance of the constituency of the courts of general juris-
diction emphasizes the importance of making sure that the commit-
ment to those courts matches the commitment to specialized
courts. Both deserve the resources available to administer alter-
nates to incarceration. In the pre-plea stages of a proceeding, a
judge of the general criminal jurisdiction court is responsible for
putting in place and supervising any alternative to incarceration.
After a plea of guilty or conviction after trial, the judge can ask for
the assistance of the probation department in supervising the de-
fendant, or can individually undertake the responsibility. After the
imposition of the sentence, the probation department is the admin-
istrative and supervising agency until the department re-engages
the judge in the event of a problem. This structure depends on two
factors: first, the ability of the busy judge to participate in the de-
tails of setting up a program for a defendant and supervising that
participation; and second, the ability of local probation officers to
perform their statutory obligations and traditional functions.
As a judge of general criminal jurisdiction, I have sought to find
ways to identify those defendants who should be given an opportu-
nity to avoid jail or prison by participating in programs that are
alternatives to incarceration, and I have tried to encourage the ef-
forts of these defendants.
The first task is to find a suitable program to do a screening in-
terview of the defendant. The search for a suitable program is com-
plicated if the defendant has multiple problems, such as drug
addiction, AIDS, or mental retardation.23 Programs assisting de-
fendants with multiple problems are limited. Although in 1994 the
Unified Court report recommended use of a data base of all pro-
grams and their target populations, there is no updated list of avail-
able programs. Nonetheless, over time I have learned about
available programs that are funded by local, state, and federal gov-
ernment levels, and by private agencies and foundations. Through
repeated efforts, I have learned the names and telephone numbers
of directors and intake officers.
The second task is to arrange for admission of the defendant to
the program. I have arranged for intake interviews. I have assisted
in efforts to obtain necessary documentation required for admis-
sion. These documents included school records, as well as mental
23. See supra text accompanying note 10.
1099
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
health records from private doctors and hospitals, prison health
services, and public hospitals. I have assisted in attaining medicaid,
housing, and other benefits which have been delayed or improperly
denied to defndants. In one case, I assisted when the defendant
was disqualified for benefits because an outstanding warrant, that
had long been resolved, came up on the computer.
The third task is to monitor and supervise the defendant's partic-
ipation in the program once the defendant is accepted into either
an inpatient or outpatient program. Written, detailed, and periodic
progress reports are necessary to monitor the defendant. If the re-
ports are not supplied or sufficiently specific, I contact the program
personnel for the necessary information.
I also communicate with the program staff to make clear that if
the defendant violates program rules, uses drugs, absconds, or is
expelled from the program, such incidents must be reported to the
court immediately.
In one case, the immediate reporting resulted in a miraculous
recovery. The defendant had been placed in a drug rehabilitation
program. During the course of attending required counseling, the
defendant became highly distressed. The program counselor re-
ported to me that the defendant would be dismissed from the pro-
gram because the facility could not handle the problem. The
program delayed any action until I was able to reach a doctor who
agreed to walk the defendant through emergency intake at the psy-
chiatric unit of a hospital. The program representative took the
defendant to the hospital. There the defendant was admitted, re-
ceived several months of treatment, returned to the program and
completed it successfully.
The help that I have received from both the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel has demonstrated that judges will greatly benefit in
their efforts from a systematized and courtwide administration of-
fering help comparable to that given to specialized courts.
The District Attorney of Bronx County, working with a program
called Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime ("TASC"), 24 has es-
tablished a highly organized program of screening, program selec-
tion, and supervision for those charged with drug offenses. Once
the prosecutor determines that a defendant is eligible, TASC repre-
sentatives interview the defendant to determine eligibility for one
of the programs is in the community. TASC collects the necessary
paperwork, finds the program, makes sure that the defendant is
24. See Education and Assistance Corporation, Programs & Services, at http://
www.eacinc.org/criminal.htm#Bronx%20tasc (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
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transported to the program, makes sure that the program supplies
the necessary reports, arranges for court dates, and reports mis-
steps, expulsions, and successes. At the completion of the eighteen
to twenty-four month program, TASC advises the court whether
the imposition of the non-incarceratory promised sentence is ap-
propriate. TASC is a courtwide program, assisting all judges, but is
limited to defendants charged with drug offenses deemed eligible
by the prosecutor.
In many cases defense counsel has also provided much needed
assistance. The time consuming nature of program associated
work, and the need to tend to it immediately, however, is some-
times incompatible with the demands of criminal litigation that
face every defense lawyer. In the last few years, an agency called
Defense Advocacy Services has been providing assistance to locate
programs, arrange screening, conduct interviews, collect required
paperwork, and escort defendants to program facilities. The pro-
gram has done an excellent job, often acting beyond the call of
duty. This program, like TASC, is available to all judges. Its re-
sources, however, are limited by budget constraints.
There are several programs that have their own administrators
who, when contacted by the judge, arrange for screening interviews
and do all the administrative work needed for the admission of an
defendant accepted into the program. One of the most significant
is the St. Elizabeth Ann's program affiliated with St. Vincent's
Hospital.2 5 The program is a dual diagnosis program. For one de-
fendant, it provided a safe and comfortable haven until he died; for
another, it restored him to a modicum of health that now enables
him to live in circumstances approaching reasonable normalcy.
There are some defendants who are already receiving medical or
psychiatric treatment. For these defendants, it makes sense to
make those existing arrangements into a program that satisfies the
meaning of an alternative to incarceration. In several cases, the
prosecutor has agreed to accept a plea to a crime allowing a non-
incarceratory sentence after the defendant continued treatment for
approximately two years with periodic reporting to me along with
the submission of reports from the treatment providers. One of
the defendants was treated weekly at a Veterans Administration
Hospital where he was trained to take his medication; another was
treated by a psychologist and attended a vocational training school;
25. See Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers: St. Elizabeth Ann's Health Care
& Rehabilitation Center, at http://www.svcmc.org/stelizabethann (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
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and another went to a combination of medical and psychiatric
clinics.
The remaining need of courts of general jurisdiction, as well as of
the community, is a properly funded and staffed probation depart-
ment. In all the reports, cited above, it has been stated that proba-
tion departments, locally funded and organized, must be given
resources to fulfill their post-plea supervision responsibilities, also
known as interim supervision, and their traditional role as supervi-
sors of those on probation imposed as a sentence.
It appears that the specialized court approach has resulted in
neglect of local probation departments, the traditional agencies for
providing information to the court about defendants and for pro-
viding services and conducting supervision of defendants. They
have been inadequately funded, understaffed, and left in the back-
water of technological development, 26 pre-empted by a new layer
of service providers and administrators. This deprivation of re-
sources has caused serious limitations on the traditional functions
of local probation offices. Specialized courts did not cause the fail-
ure of support for probation departments27 because funding for the
two comes from different sources. Nevertheless, it is hoped that
the current emphasis on funding and staffing specialized courts will
stimulate efforts to reinvigorate regular probation services and
staffing. The problems created by the underfunding and conse-
quent underutilization of probation departments affects the work
of courts of general criminal jurisdiction. It is, however, the proba-
tion department that provides a ready made infrastructure for ad-
ministering problem solving programs in courts of general criminal
jurisdiction.
In 1995, the Unified Court System report concluded that "most
judges are unable to assume responsibility for monitoring a sen-
tenced offender's progress in an alternate program. As a result,
this responsibility should be borne by the local probation depart-
ment, which should be appropriately funded for this responsibil-
ity. ' ' 28 The report notes that the statutes require the probation
department to monitor the sentenced offender and that the legal
obligations make "the probation department ideally suited to fulfill
this monitoring function. '2 9 At least since the State Bar's 1988 re-
26. FISKE REPORT, supra note 2, at 76-80; UNIIFIED COURT, supra note 2, at 17-18;
City Bar, supra note 2, at 398-404.
27. See State Bar, supra note 2, at 36-43.
28. UNIFIED COURT, supra note 2, at 38.
29. 1d. at 39.
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port, proper and sufficient funding and staffing of probation de-
partments has been recognized as an important need. The
significance of that need is enhanced by the present effort not only
to supervise people who return to the community, but also people
who are in programs as alternatives to prison.
CONCLUSION
Every defendant eligible for a sentence that is an alternate to
incarceration should be given the opportunity to have such a sen-
tence. Countywide support services for all courts is the key to
making such programs available to every such defendant. To ac-
complish this important goal, the recognized achievements of spe-
cialized courts should be used to generate support services for
courts of general jurisdiction and the local probation departments.
4 AS
